< Previous | Writings Home | Next > |
---|
Ontology is described as "the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being." In Book X of "The Republic," Plato, through his portrayal of Socrates, makes several arguments against mimesis. In other words, Plato argues against representation, specifically in art and literature. One basis on which Plato builds his arguments is the ontological aspects of reality and art.
To begin building his case against representation, Plato - or, rather, Socrates - assumes that the audiences of tragedies and poems do not have the faculties to tell truth from fiction. In his own words "...it looks as though the whole genre of poetry deforms its audience's minds, unless they have the antidote, which is recognition of what this kind of poetry is actually like" (67).
Socrates explains this point by talking about the "plurality of things which have a single name" (68) and by calling them "types." He says that any craftsman could build any number of beds or tables, but that he'd only be making types of beds or tables, rather than the beds or tables themselves. To put it another way, any craftsman can only build a physical type of an object, but cannot build, change, or otherwise alter the "idea" of that object. Taken one step further, every object on this earth, living and inanimate, is only a representation of its "idea" form. Everything is just a type. And from this point, Socrates assembles one of his most solid arguments against mimesis.
If everything on this earth is just a representation of its perfect form, then creation can be accomplished simply by finding ways to represent them. The example Socrates uses is that of a mirror. He says that everything in the sky, every creature and plant on the earth, and everything else can be reflected in a mirror, and therefore achieve a level of representation (69). Glaucon, the man with whom Socrates is conversing, points out that it is only a representation and not true creation, and Socrates follows up by saying that painters don't create anything real, either. He says "it's similar to something real, but it isn't actually real" (69). From this, Socrates concludes that there are three levels of reality: the "real" or "idea" created by God, the "type" of bed built by a carpenter or manufacturer, and the representation made by the poet or painter (69, 70).
This by itself doesn't make mimesis bad in Socrates' eyes. What does make imitation detrimental to society is when a person sees paintings and can't tell them apart from reality, or a person hears poetry and believes that everything he's heard is real. As Socrates says at the start, "this whole genre of poetry deforms its audience's minds, unless they [recognize] what this kind of poetry is actually like" (67). Socrates wants representational poetry banned because it's only a representation of the physical world, which is just a type of the idea world. Because it's "two generations away from the throne of truth" (70), it is, for all intents and purposes, a lie. Poets and painters don't actually understand how to build beds, but because they can make their audiences believe that they do, it's a detriment to the audiences' growth.
Socrates doesn't have anything against artists themselves. As he says, he's admired Homer ever since he was young, but he feels a greater responsibility towards truth than he does towards any single person (68), and this pursuit of truth is one of the very reasons why he feels he must speak out against representation in art. Because mimesis is an imitation of the physical world (which is just a type of the "idea" world created by God), it's too far away from truth to be acceptable. There are other reasons why Socrates feels it is the right choice to refuse "any representational poetry" (67) in his community, but he makes his ontological arguments first because they frame what is real and set the frameworks for his pursuit of the truth.
Works Cited
Plato. From "Republic." Trans. Robin Waterfield. The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Ed. Vincent B. Leitch. New York: Norton, 2001. 67-70.